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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN BRAZIL:  
STOCK, BONDS AND SUBSTITUTION 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Purpose: To study the Brazilian bond and stock markets for testing the stock market 
development theory of Demirgüc-Kunt & Maksimovic (1996). 
Originality/Gap/Relevance/Implications: This paper tests the substitution hypothesis of 
stock market development, from debt to stocks, in a context of improved corporate 
governance, by analysing the data with cointegration techniques. The findings show that the 
substitution hypothesis is rejected, as the bond market has a positive and significant 
association with stock market improvements. The findings also show that improving the 
quality of corporate governance could lead own and borrower capital sources to be 
complementary and not substitutes, suggesting that Brazilian stock market reform has created 
a virtuous development cycle. 
Key methodological aspects: Positivist research using quantitative methodology. Data from 
a sample of 171 firms during 20 years´ analysed with cointegration. The null was a negative 
association between bond and stock markets.  
Summary of key results: Null rejection, non-consistent to theoretical framework. The results 
have shown a positive and significant association between stock and debt in an improved 
corporate governance context. 
Key considerations/conclusions: Improving the quality of corporate governance could lead 
own and borrower capital sources to be complementary and not substitutes, suggesting that 
Brazilian stock market reform has created a virtuous development cycle. 
KEYWORDS 
Stock Market Development, Bond Market Development, Capital Structure, Corporate 
Governance, Bond and Stock Complementarity Hypothesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
As a company´s growth leads to greater capital needs, managers can issue stocks. For 
this purpose, there is a dispersion of ownership and a consequent dilution of control among 
many agents. Managers or majority shareholders lose some control over the company’s 
decisions, but maintain control through other means when compared to minority shareholders. 
This can affect the return for minority shareholders or investors. Several corporate governance 
mechanisms, including legal ones, have been developed in order to help minority shareholders 
avoid losses and to improve the disclosure of information and protection of investors, 
especially individuals. Corporate governance has the main goal of diminishing the 
asymmetric information between managers and investors, which can be accentuated with the 
dispersion of capital ownership as a natural consequence of stock market development 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
However, stock market development could lead to the retraction of bank and bond 
markets. The more companies have access to a stock market, the more the bank and bond 
markets diminish their operations, considering the limits on investment projects. In general, 
the literature has shown an association between stock market and bond market development 
(Demirgüc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1996). Such an association is negative for developed stock 
markets and positive for developing stock markets, but the positivity is only valid for bigger 
companies. This evidence appears to contradict other authors, such as (Booth, Aivazian, 
Demirgüc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001), who claim that the financial choices of companies in 
developed and developing stock markets are very similar. Thus, the empirical evidence is 
non-conclusive. 
The rational expectations theory of Muth (1961), along with the capital structure 
irrelevance theory of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the trade-off theory of (Modigliani & 
Miller, 1963), and the pecking order theory of (Myers S. , 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984) allow 
us to question whether there would actually be a substitution of bonds by stocks when a stock 
market develops. Under the rational expectations theory, only future interests determine the 
prices of stocks and bonds  (Muth, 1961; Fisher, 1896; Fama, 1970), while the debt-equity 
relationship would be irrelevant or generated by other variables (Modigliani & Miller, 1958; 
 
 
1963; Myers S. , 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984), not necessarily depending on stock market 
development.  
Although other theories contradict the association between financial choices and the 
level of stock market development, countries around the world adopted rules for developing 
stock markets. Improvements included increasing the quality of information, protecting 
minority shareholders, and creating different listing segments (Reed, 2002; Mallin & Ow-
Yong, 2010). In Brazil, corporate governance reform created the listing segment Novo 
Mercado, with significant improvements in information disclosure and shareholder protection 
(Rabelo & Vasconcelos, 2002). Consequently, the hypothesis is that the growth of the 
Brazilian stock market and corporate governance reform would reduce the size of the bond 
market.  
The private and state-owned Brazilian banks possibly have a significant share of 
companies’ long-term loans, whether as direct agents, business intermediaries, or bond 
issuance advisors or leadership dealers. Through the substitution hypothesis, the profitability 
of banks would be affected by the reduction of operations. Additionally up to this scenario, 
banks would lobby in order to guarantee profits. By deduction, Brazilian banks would be 
expected to put up a tough opposition to stock market development and sponsor movements 
for impeding it.  
Studying the consistency of stock market development in Brazil allows us to consider 
the effects of corporate governance reform, and theories of rational expectations and capital 
structure. For this reason, this study aims to examine the association between debt and equity 
in such a context. Using data from 1993 to 2013, 171 Brazilian public companies were 
analysed with cointegration techniques  (Johansen S. , 1988; Johansen & Juselius, 1990; 
Johansen S. , 1991). The results show that the Brazilian corporate governance reform has 
stimulated both stock and bond markets in a complimentary movement between debt and 
equity for companies that moved to or were created in the Novo Mercado listing segment. The 
findings reject the substitution hypothesis in Brazil.  
The studies on stock market development are detailed in the next section. The third 
section presents the methodology, including sampling and econometric models. In the fourth 
section, the results are compared with those of other studies and with the suppositions of the 
capital structure theory. The last section presents some concluding remarks.  
 
 
  
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
From a macroeconomic perspective, these studies relate stock market development to 
economic growth, liberalization, corporate governance reform and financial choices of 
companies. 
Jensen (1972) revised and discussed the models and theories that tried to explain stock 
market returns, and found that models with market factors explained returns more accurately.  
At the company level, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) studied the financial 
choices and stock market development in 30 developed and developing countries from 1980 
to 1991. The results indicated that in general, a company’s leverage is positively associated 
with bond markets and negatively (although non-significantly) with stock market 
development. For this reason, the paper could be considered to be a seminal work in stock 
market development theory. However, when segregating the sample, the authors identified the 
substitution of bonds by stocks in developed countries and an increasing leverage for the 
biggest firms in developing countries as the stock market developed.  
Otherwise, small companies in developing countries were not affected by the 
improvement of the stock market. From this observation, the authors hypothesized a 
substitution of bonds by stocks in developed countries, which became central in the stock 
market development theory. 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (1996) found a strong correlation between stock market 
development and the banking market in most of the 44 developed and developing countries of 
their sample, from 1986 to 1993. The authors also highlighted the relevance of corporate 
governance on liquidity and volatility in the stock markets. Thus, the stock market 
development theory was improved with the inclusion of effects of corporate governance 
mechanisms and the behaviour of developing stock markets. 
Levine and Zervos (1996) observed a positive association between stock market 
development and long-term economic growth in a sample of 41 countries from 1976 to 1993, 
using the stock market development measures of Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (1996). In this 
study, institutional and macroeconomic characteristics also emerged as relevant variables in 
the behaviour of bond and stock markets. 
 
For Demetriades and Hussein (1996), the findings about an association between 
economic growth and stock market development are not consistent when analysed with 
different analysis techniques. Economic growth and stock market development were found to 
 
 
be positively related, or at least the former would have a positive effect on the latter. The 
result was obtained through cointegration and causality techniques for a sample of 16 
countries. The authors argued that inappropriate techniques were the main weaknesses of 
other studies. Although correct in challenging other findings, such a study nonetheless 
adheres to stock market development theory because it doesn´t reject the inverse relationship 
between bonds and stocks. 
De Santis and Imrohoroglu (1997) didn´t observe any association between market 
liberalization, which includes stock market development, and stock price volatility in the 
developing stock markets of Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America from 1988 to 
1996.  
However, contrary evidence was gathered by Levine and Zervos (1998), who observed 
that stocks tended to increase in value while gaining liquidity, volatility, and integration after 
liberalization. Beyond that, the authors found that increasing international integration is 
experienced by countries with better information disclosure. The results prove the relevance 
of corporate governance mechanisms, as did Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005), who 
found that liberalization of stock markets increases annual economic growth by 1%. Levine 
and Zervos (1998) later found resistance from Stiglitz (2000), who claimed that liberalization 
doesn´t affect stock markets. 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) assumed that a country’s financial development would 
reduce the cost of capital, allowing financially constrained companies to grow faster in 
countries with more developed financial markets. For a sample of 41 countries from 1980 to 
1990, the authors found their hypothesis to be supported. Such evidence strengthens the idea 
that stock market development decreases the cost of capital.  
Wurgler (2000) pointed out the positive association between the legal protection of 
minority shareholders and the efficient allocation of capital in companies. For Bekaert, 
Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002), however, the new rules only produced changes for stock 
market development if they allowed the entrance of foreign capital. 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) examined stock market development and per capita 
income of countries, concluding that internal resources are needed for stock market 
development. 
Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) found a positive and significant association between 
financial intermediary development and economic growth, productivity, tangibility, and 
private savings rates. It is relevant to the analysis, considering that stock market development 
 
 
could be related to the increase in volume and liquidity of shares of financial intermediaries or 
banks, as in Kominek (2004). 
Perotti and Van Oijen (2001) argue stock market development is determined by political 
risk that arose from selling state owned enterprises. The sample was 22 countries from 1988 
to 1995. Institutional characteristics were identified as relevant variables for controlling the 
association between stocks and bonds.  
Edison et al. (2002) weren´t able to reject the null hypothesis that economic integration 
doesn´t increase the speed of economic growth, analysing data in a dynamic panel of 57 
countries. Conversely, Beck and Levine (2004) reported that economic growth was influenced 
by the stock and bond market development, as did Tachiwou (2010) when analysing the 
countries of the West African monetary union.  
Chinn and Ito (2006) argue that increasing liberalization leading to increasing stock 
market development would only hold if legal development was also achieved. Therefore, the 
institutional variable is highlighted once again between stocks and bonds. 
Mitton (2006) found higher stock return, investment, profitability, efficiency, and lower 
leverage rates in countries with foreign direct investments. 
In Belgium, Van Nieuwerburgh, Buelens and Cuyvers (2006) found stock market 
development determined economic growth and such a relationship varies over time due to 
institutional changes, consistent with the findings of other studies. 
De la Torre, Gozzi and Schmukler (2007) analysed the impact of corporate governance 
reforms on stock market development in six countries and found the reforms also stimulated 
internationalization and increased share values and trading, but increased the risk of contagion 
from international financial crises. 
Klein and Olivei (2008) found a significant and economically relevant association 
among liberalization, financial development, and economic growth from 1976 to 1995 in 95 
countries.  
Hasan, Wachtel and Zhou (2009) found that financial companies stimulated Chinese 
provinces´ economic growth, showing a lack of other funding sources.  
Croci and Petmezas (2010) found that stock market development is associated with the 
target minority shareholders´ return in mergers and acquisitions operations for scale purposes. 
Finally, the substitution hypothesis has been extended to developing countries in 
Demirgüc-Kunt, Feyen and Levine (2013). They observed 72 countries from 1980 to 2008 
and found that stock and bond markets develop slowly with economic growth, but in different 
 
 
ways. The bond market shrinks whilst the stock market increases. The authors applied a 
quantilic regression for analysing the data. 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
In general, finance research could be classified as positivist or post-positivist, according 
to Creswell (2007, p. 36) because they  
…use surveys or experiments, with methods of numerical data analysis, testing and 
checking theories or explanations, identifying variables, which are reported in 
hypothesis, using standards of validity and reliability, through numerical measurement 
of information, with the application of unbiased methods and statistical procedures.  
 
This study is similarly focused on validity and reliability, as well as replication and 
generalization, when testing the stock market development theory and the respective 
substitution hypothesis. 
The main purpose of this research is examining the relationship between the stock 
market value and the debt of Brazilian companies. It takes into account the Brazilian 
corporate governance reform (Rabelo & Vasconcelos, 2002) and the possibility that stock 
market development has shrunk the bond market, as mentioned in other studies (Demirgüc-
Kunt & Maksimovic, 1996; Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001; 
Demirgüc-Kunt, Feyen, & Levine, 2013).  
The hypothesis is that there is complementarity of funding sources between stock and 
bond markets and not substitution when considering corporate governance reform in Brazil.  
The sample is made of 171 Brazilian public companies from the 2
nd
 quarter of 1994 to 
1
st
 quarter of 2013. The analysis was done for the full sample and two subsamples, one of 
them for NovoMercado and another one for the other listing segments. The data were obtained 
from a local financial database named Economática and the models were estimated using 
Stata. 
 
Since the Brazilian corporate governance reform in 2000 (Rabelo & Vasconcelos, 
2002), there are four listing segments, with NovoMercado being the one that obliges the 
companies to provide stronger information disclosure and shareholder protection. The sample 
contains 91 companies from the traditional listing segment, 18 from the N1, 7 from the N2 
and 55 from the NovoMercado. The companies belong to 20 different activities, with utilities 
(28) and transportation (27) having the biggest part of the sample. 
 
 
 Banks and financial institutions were excluded from the sample, as well as companies 
with less than 50 quarters of data or without debt data. 
The data on debt, stock market value, debt on equity, return, size, tangibility, and 
growth of companies were gathered, as shown in Table 1. From the summation of firm-level 
variables, the data in the aggregate were obtained for applying cointegration techniques.  
The association between debt and stock market value was analysed as was the 
relationship between leverage and return. In both cases, the coefficients were controlled for 
size, tangibility, and growth, as they are traditional determinants of capital structure (Titman 
& Wessels, 1988). 
 
TABLE 1 
Variables description 
Variable description  source  reason 
Debt on Equity 
(D/E) 
Total debt scaled on stock 
market value 
Economática Leverage, representing 
bond and stock market 
development  
(Demirgüc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 1996) 
Return 
(Ret) 
Stock market value on 
lagged stock market value 
Economática Stock market development 
measure 
(Demirgüc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 1996) 
Debt 
(D) 
 
Total debt  Economatica Bond market development 
measure 
(Demirgüc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 1996) 
Market capitalization 
(Mcap) 
Stock market value  Economatica Stock market development 
measure 
Size 
(S)  
 
Logarithm of total sales Economatica Controle variable 
(Titman & Wessels, 1988) 
Tangibility 
(Tang) 
Property, plant and 
equipment on toal assets 
Economatica Control variable 
(Titman & Wessels, 1988) 
Growth 
(G) 
Market value of 
enterpriseon total assets 
Economatica Control variable 
(Titman & Wessels, 1988) 
Source: Authors, upon Demirgüc-Kunt & Maksimovic (1996) and Titman & Wessels (1988). 
 
 
The mean of debt on equity in the full sample is 19.29 per cent, with 47.31 per cent for 
NovoMercado and 19.34 per cent for the rest of listing segments, as shown in Table 2. The 
aggregate data presents a more accurate relationship between debt and stock market value, as 
shown in Table 3, and allows the observation that leverage on the NovoMercado is 
significantly higher than other listing segments, as Table 1 shows.  
 
 
The NovoMercado also presented lower tangibility and higher growth than other 
segments, as shown in Table 2, which suggests that the higher leverage of the segment could 
be linked to growth opportunities. 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Complete Sample 
D 80 27031,67 59752,81 0 199120,6 
Mcap 80 305092,8 330401,1 125,0934 1030710 
D/E 80 0,1929855 0,2660535 0 1,208206 
Ret 79 10,34699 58,40298 0,0029442 406,3346 
S 79 7,303214 3,813907 2,190773 12,82549 
Tang 79 106,0721 195,1595 1,321277 544,8085 
G 79 1,238983 0,5080306 0,0033429 2,34789 
Novo Mercado 
D 80 42,76305 52,68383 0 179,8991 
Mcap 80 104,1658 115,9877 1,781375 339,2237 
D/E 80 0,4731749 0,392733 0 2,307404 
Ret 79 1,098249 0,2637436 0,512116 2,077643 
S 79 2,570925 1,904365 -1,85915 5,368668 
Tang 79 0,3433495 0,0927787 0,1839566 0,5827093 
G 79 2,195123 3,185442 0,3666426 14,10159 
Other segments 
D 80 26988,9 59708,33 0 199084 
Mcap 80 304988,6 330289,4 123,2232 1030445 
D/E 80 0,1934474 0,2691429 0 1,243467 
Ret 79 11,116 63,17201 0,0026851 435,8956 
S 79 7,254973 3,844536 2,173196 12,82492 
Tang 79 0,4634454 0,2581408 0,001739 0,7608917 
G 79 1,231889 0,5048354 0,0032033 2,348201 
 
 
Note: Table 2 presents the mean, standard deviation, and the maximum and 
minimum figures of each variable analysed in this study. The variables are 
presented on an aggregate level, which is the summation of firm-level 
figures. Variables details are presented in Table 1.  
Source: Authors 
 
The five possible models of Johansen´s cointegration (Johansen S. , 1988; 1991) were 
developed in the sample data. The cointegration is observed among non-stationary variables 
that relate to one another through residuals in the long run and have a short-run mechanism 
for error correction. 
 
 
In this sense, the difference among applied models refers to the existence of an intercept 
or trend and drift in the long and short-run relationship equations, as well as in the 
specification of linearity of the trend or even in both (Asteriou & Hall, 2011).  
Therefore, the different models allow us to check whether relationship variables stay 
smooth over time or assume several different shapes, which would be translated into equation 
coefficients. In Table 3, the five model estimates for all the samples, and the long-run 
relationship equations, including coefficients and statistical significance are presented. 
The simplest model, although improbable, suggests that there is neither an intercept nor 
a trend in the long-run or short-run relationship with the assumption that there are no 
deterministic components in the data.  
The second model is an intercept only in the long-run relationship. Therefore, there are 
no linear trends in the data and the intercept is restricted to the long run, with first differences 
having a zero mean. 
The third model has a long-run intercept that is cancelled out by the intercept in the 
short-run relationship, without linear trends in the level variables, while the specifications are 
allowed to drift around an intercept. 
The fourth includes a trend in the long run with an intercept, which is also allowed in 
the short run without trends. 
The last model allows for linear trends in the short-run model and quadratic trends in 
the long-run relationship (Asteriou & Hall, 2011). 
An estimation of the five alternative models was conducted to determine the best 
specification and to check whether the changes would have more impact on the sense and 
significance of association among stock market values and debt. Relevant differences could 
indicate bias in the model specification.  
Cointegration techniques have been chosen for their many advantages: their ability to 
measure the correction from disequilibrium of the previous period; the solution they provide 
to the problem of spurious regression as the error correction mechanisms are formulated in 
terms of first differences; the ease in econometric modelling and the prevention of increases 
in long-run relationship errors(Asteriou & Hall, 2011, p. 359). The cointegration techniques 
are also based on an attempt to validate other findings acquired through time series methods. 
The variables´ stationarity was tested, along with the appropriate lag length of the 
relationship among the variables, the best specification among the five possible models, the 
que rank of cointegration, and the long-run and short-run relationship equations. The next 
 
 
section presents the coefficients of long-run relationship, which serves for testing the null 
hypothesis. 
One could consider the omission of the maximum likelihood specification used in the 
research, and the demonstration of normal distribution of the data, to be restrictions for this 
paper. However, such an eventual restriction is likely to be mitigated through the rigorous 
application of all cointegration techniques´ procedures preconized by Johansen (1988; 1991), 
in a way that the identification of the parameters shown in Table 3 were not misstated. This 
identification required that the debt variable was normalized to 1. Additionally, Table 2 shows 
the description of all variables. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As presented in Table 2, the mean leverage of NovoMercado was higher (47.31 per 
cent) than the full sample (19.29 per cent) and the rest of segments (19.34 per cent). 
The NovoMercado was marked by higher growth and lower tangibility, as highlighted 
in Table 2, reinforcing the growth opportunities set as capital structure determinants. 
Most specifications of the cointegration models were made using the stationarity 
checking and information criteria of Akaike and Schwartz, except for the rank of 
cointegration, which was determined using the maximum likelihood and trace tests.  
The findings were compared with those of the reviewed literature, which was directly 
related to stock market development theory. In addition, Table 3 shows only the long-run 
relationship equations, the respective statistical significance, and the maximum likelihood and 
trace test´s results. Time series causality tests weren´t developed due to the focus on the long-
run and short-run relationship estimates and not on the positioning of variables in a single 
vector autoregressive. The possibility of spurious regression is solved by the stationarity of 
the error correction mechanism term, as already noted. 
The null substitution hypothesis was rejected for the NovoMercado. Table 3 shows that 
all the models which considered debt presented a positive association between debt and stock 
market value, with strong significance in most of them and with the tests pointing out the 
correct specification of the models that were controlled by traditional determinants of capital 
structure. 
Such a finding is contrary to those of Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996), Booth et 
al. (2001), and Demirgüc-Kunt, Feyen and Levine (2013), which found a retraction of bond 
markets with the expansion of the stock market. These authors argue that the bigger 
companies would benefit from stock market development in developing countries and that the 
 
 
economic growth would generate a retraction of bond markets in developed and developing 
countries. 
The rejection of the hypothesis becomes more clear when the coefficients of different 
samples are matched. The observed association for the full sample and the rest of the 
segments’ samples is negative and significant, except for the restricted model, which should 
be taken cautiously (Asteriou & Hall, 2011). 
Whilst all the models point out complementarity between debt and stock market value 
for the companies belonging to the NovoMercado, the opposite (substitution) is observed in 
the segments where there would be less disclosure and shareholder protection. 
Analysing the size effect, the argument that bigger companies would have benefits from 
stock market development in the presence of developing stock markets (Demirgüc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 1996) was not fully validated, because the size variable presented negative 
impacts in the NovoMercado compared to most models. The negative impact appears not only 
to reject the suggestion of a supposed benefit but also to suggest an advantage of smaller 
companies within NovoMercado. 
The findings are not consistent with the observation of Titman and Wessels (1988) that 
smaller companies would have higher bond and stock issuing costs and would use mainly 
short-term debt. 
The comparison of the findings for NovoMercado with those of other samples amplifies 
their relevance. In other samples, the positive and significant association between size is 
strongly observed, confirming the results of other studies (Demirgüc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 
1996; Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001; Demirgüc-Kunt, Feyen, & 
Levine, 2013; Titman & Wessels, 1988), which have indicated the importance of size for 
obtaining benefits from stock market development. 
The positive association between bond and stock markets also is consistent with the 
irrelevance of capital structure theory (Modigliani & Miller, 1958), as the simultaneous 
issuance of debt and stocks would be irrelevant for the stock market value. On the other hand, 
the positive association is not consistent with the trade-off (Modigliani & Miller, 1963) and 
pecking-order (Myers S. , 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984) theories, which hold the expansion of 
bond markets against stock market development, in the presence of tax shields and 
asymmetric information.  
Asymmetric information appears to be relevant in the findings. The different sense for 
the variables in the NovoMercado and other samples could indicate that the corporate 
governance reform allowed better information disclosure and shareholder protection, as 
 
 
observed in studies where the relevance of shareholder protection acts were relevant for stock 
market development (Demirgüc-Kunt & Levine, 1996; Wurgler, 2000; De la Torre, Gozzi, & 
Schmukler, 2007; Levine & Zervos, 1998).  
The tangibility variable doesn´t show any association, for the full sample or the other 
segments’ samples. The argument of Titman and Wessels (1988), that more tangibility leads 
to more favourable conditions for borrowers, leading companies to issue stocks, was not 
found to be significant, although a positive and marginally significant direction had been 
observed in those samples. The opposite, however, was observed for NovoMercado, were less 
tangible companies were related positively and significantly to stock market development, 
which confirms their argument (Titman & Wessels, 1988). 
The growth variable presented a negative and significant association in most models of 
NovoMercado, but non-significant for the full sample and other segments. Such a result lends 
consistency to the argument of Titman and Wessels (1988) that growth would be negatively 
related to capital structure, even it seems contradictory to the result of the tangibility variable, 
which could also represent existing growth opportunities. 
Additionally, such a result is not consistent with the studies that observed positive 
association between stock market development and economic growth (Levine & Zervos, 
1996; Rousseau & Wachtel, 2000; Beck, Levine, & Loayza, 2000; Tachiwou, 2010; 
Demirgüc-Kunt, Feyen, & Levine, 2013). However, they are consistent with the findings of 
Demetriades and Hussein (1996), although they refute the argument that inadequate chosen 
techniques by the cointegration.  
The models´ analysis of cointegration between leverage and return has relevant aspects, 
such as the fact that the debt and stock market value, directly measured, seem to better reflect 
the bond and stock market development. 
According to the rank of cointegration that was found through maximum likelihood and 
trace statistics, neither of the models where leverage and return are have only one 
cointegration vector, instead of the quantity used in the estimates. 
Otherwise, the perfect specifications were obtained for debt and stock market value 
where the trace and max statistics presented only one rank of cointegration, once the results 
indicated the existence of a rank (Asteriou & Hall, 2011). 
In all samples, the return presented a negative and significant association with the 
leverage of companies, consistent with Demirgüc-Kunt and Masimovic (1996) and Demirgüc-
Kunt, Feyen and Levine (2013). Size and growth presented positive and significant 
associations for the full sample and other segments’ samples, just as tangibility, where only 
 
 
the impact was different for other segments. In the NovoMercado, the control variables 
presented several impacts and associations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 
Cointegration equations between Bond and Stock Market Development 
  constant rconstant Trend rtrend none 
Full sample coef p 
 
coef p 
 
coef p 
 
coef p 
 
coef p 
 
D 1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  Mcap -2,2201 0,000  ***  -2,2382 0,000 *** -0,0697 0,773 
 
-0,0694 0,775 
 
0,6293 0,000 *** 
S 246622,10 0,000  ***  248962,30 0,000 *** 127643,50 0,000 *** 127890,70 0,000 *** -92295,19 0,000 *** 
Tang -599,7284 0,177 
 
-608,9677 0,175 
 
-16,5888 0,929 
 
-17,0652 0,927 
 
729,0380 0,000 *** 
G 123799,90 0,469 
 
122846,60 0,477 
 
-36004,86 0,611 
 
-36401,53 0,608 
 
288939,90 0,000 *** 
_trend 
      
-5804,78 . 
 
-16313,91 0,000 *** 
   _cons -792634,50 . 
 
-1239649,00 0,000 *** 37178,61 . 
 
429585,10 . 
    
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
trace 46,3003 1 
 
50,1584 1 
 
50,2560 1 
 
55,8819 1 
 
18,2358 1 
 
max 6,2987 2 
 
8,0447 2 
 
9,9364 2 
 
9,9395 2 
 
8,7988 1 
 
                
Novo Mercado 
               D 1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  Mcap 2,1042 0,000  ***  2,1201 0,000 *** 0,0497 0,935 
 
0,0461 0,940 
 
2,0388 0,000 *** 
S -194,1758 0,000  ***  -195,4871 0,000 *** 372,5698 0,000 *** 369,8991 0,000 *** -184,9566 0,000 *** 
Tang 820,4475 0,003  **  824,9173 0,004 ** -915,2639 0,005 ** -909,8051 0,005 ** 866,8196 0,000 *** 
G -37,6202 0,000  ***  -37,9664 0,000 *** 1,8773 0,880 
 
1,7508 0,887 
 
-33,6166 0,000 *** 
_trend 
      
-34,8432 . 
 
-30,6814 0,000 *** 
   _cons -159,7648 . 
 
43,2287 0,699 
 
387,9523 . 
 
217,0951 . 
    
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
trace 40,9219 1 
 
45,0826 1 
 
47,6738 1 
 
50,5311 1 
 
35,8452 1 
 
max 26,8461 1 
 
26,9489 1 
 
29,2260 1 
 
29,4478 1 
 
7,8723 2 
                 
Other segments 
               D 1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  Mcap -5,4130 0,000  ***  -5,5810 0,000 *** -0,0689 0,816 
 
-0,0688 0,817 
 
0,1605 0,006 ** 
S 630131,50 0,000  ***  651062,80 0,000 *** 151206,80 0,000 *** 151662,80 0,000 *** -41720,29 0,000 *** 
Tang 1687359,00 0,057 t  1753318,00 0,055 t 95782,55 0,584 
 
96757,06 0,581 
 
-281773,30 0,003 ** 
G -44652,27 0,921 
 
-53554,67 0,908 
 
-86027,47 0,328 
 
-86730,80 0,326 
 
273780,10 0,000 *** 
_trend 
      
-7986,91 . 
 
-19155,90 0,000 *** 
   _cons -2576019,00 . 
 
-3744784,00 0,000 *** 11002,48 . 
 
426161,00 . 
    
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
trace 42,1898 1 
 
46,0006 1 
 
46,8958 1 
 
52,1793 1 
 
22,5979 1 
 
max 6,3163 2 
 
8,2656 2 
 
10,6161 2 
 
10,8142 2 
 
11,8273 1 
 
 
                              
 
 
Full Sample coef p   coef p   coef p   coef p   coef p   
D/E 1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  Ret -0,0110 0,000  ***  -0,0110 0,000 *** -0,0107 0,000 *** -0,0107 0,000 *** -0,0202 0,000 *** 
S 0,0248 0,000  ***  0,0248 0,000 *** 0,0534 0,039 * 0,0537 0,038 * 0,0202 0,042 * 
Tang 0,0008 0,000  ***  0,0008 0,000 *** 0,0007 0,000 *** 0,0007 0,000 *** 0,0006 0,000 *** 
G 0,2109 0,000  ***  0,2109 0,000 *** 0,1749 0,002 ** 0,1739 0,002 ** -0,1568 0,006 ** 
_trend 
      
-0,0031 . 
 
-0,0037 0,259 
    _cons -0,5985 . 
 
-0,5999 0,000 *** -0,6425 . 
 
-0,6220 . 
    
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
trace 18,3403 2 
 
27,8549 2 
 
25,6296 2 
 
26,8658 2 
 
18,2010 2 
 
max 9,8495 2 
 
12,9349 2 
 
17,7355 2 
 
17,7356 2 
 
10,8531 2 
 
                
Novo Mercado 
               D/E 1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  Ret -12,7972 0,000  ***  -11,9708 0,000 *** -11,8652 0,000 *** -11,7944 0,000 
 
-1,0851 0,000 *** 
S -0,3444 0,001  ***  -0,2786 0,003 ** -1,8604 0,004 ** -1,6903 0,009 ** 0,0533 0,034 * 
Tang -1,4062 0,287 
 
-1,1490 0,340 
 
3,5465 0,098 t 2,9265 0,179 
 
0,2845 0,452 
 
G 0,1057 0,201 
 
0,0739 0,327 
 
-0,0438 0,564 
 
-0,0043 0,956 
 
0,1690 0,000 *** 
_trend 
      
0,0503 . 
 
0,1074 0,030 * 
   _cons 15,2534 . 
 
12,8816 0,000 *** 14,7064 . 
 
12,4050 . 
    
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
trace 17,9173 2 
 
26,2040 2 
 
7,9380 3 
 
12,1196 3 
 
11,7242 2 
 
max 8,3084 2 
 
15,1584 2 
 
6,9017 3 
 
6,9665 3 
 
7,2698 2 
 
                
Other segments 
               D/E 1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  
1,0000 
  Ret -0,0112 0,000  ***  -0,0112 0,000 *** -0,0111 0,000 *** -0,0111 0,000 *** -0,0144 0,000 *** 
S 0,0206 0,000  ***  0,0206 0,000 *** 0,0337 0,210 
 
0,0341 0,206 
 
0,0183 0,003 ** 
Tang -0,4988 0,000  ***  -0,4987 0,000 *** -0,4708 0,000 *** -0,4700 0,000 *** -0,5473 0,000 *** 
G 0,1686 0,001  ***  0,1685 0,001 *** 0,1488 0,011 ** 0,1478 0,012 ** 0,0665 0,218 
 
_trend 
      
-0,0016 . 
 
-0,0017 0,619 
    _cons -0,1983 . 
 
-0,2015 0,001 *** -0,2226 . 
 
-0,2221 . 
    
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 
statistic rank 
 trace 21,2084 2 
 
28,6754 2 
 
31,6413 2 
 
32,2123 2 
 
19,4473 2 
 max 13,4496 2   14,6784 2   22,5154 2   22,5154 2   12,8706 2   
 
Note: Table 3 presents the cointegration equations corresponding to long-run relationships between the variables of: debt and stock market value, e; debt on equity and return, 
both of them controlled for size, tangibility and growth. The relationship was estimated through the techniques of Johansen (1988; 1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990), in 
the models which contain: intercept (constant); restrict intercept (rconstant); trend (trend); restrict trend (rtrend), e; without intercept and trend (none). Max e tr refers to the 
 
 
maximum likelihood and trace statistics, for computing the quantity of cointegration ranks, which result in specification of models´ analysis (Pantula´s principle). All the 
models were applied to full sample, to the companies of NovoMercado and for the set of other segments. In the models with debt, a lagged period was applied and 1 rank of 
cointegration, and in the model with debt on equity 4 lagged periods were applied and 1 rank of cointegration. Variables´ details are presented in Table 1. Statistical 
significance: t p.10; * p.05; ** p.01; *** p.001. 
Source: Authors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The findings of this research show that corporate governance reform in Brazil 
simultaneously stimulated the stock bond market, confirming the stock and bond 
complementarity hypothesis in the Brazilian companies that moved to or were created in the 
NovoMercado. 
Such results are contrary to those observed in other studies, but are consistent with the 
theoretical framework of capital structure irrelevance for NovoMercado. The bond market 
size increased in the same way as that of the stock market for this listing segment, making 
plausible the supposition that a company´s stock value does not depend on its capital 
structure, but only on its projects´ risks. 
The substitution hypothesis, standard for developed countries, was not validated for the 
Brazilian stock market. A possible explanation for such an observation is that developing 
countries have more projects, such as infrastructure, housing, and real estate, to be explored 
than developed ones. 
Even if capital structure determinants were the same in developing and developed 
countries, theories with assumptions of symmetric information, such as capital structure 
irrelevance (Modigliani & Miller, 1958) could offer consistency to the findings due to the 
reduction of asymmetric information that comes from the corporate governance reforms. The 
reduction of asymmetric information would stimulate the complementarity between stock and 
debt, which is reinforced by the findings for the NovoMercado. The direct measures of stock 
market value and debt showed better specification than debt on equity and return for capturing 
the level of stock and bond market development. Therefore, corporate governance reform 
could, with institutional characteristics, result in a virtuous cycle between stock and debt, 
making these sources complementary and not substitutes. 
The data were analysed with cointegration techniques, which could imply an 
improvement on the traditional tools applied in prior studies about stock market development 
and a stimulation of the understanding of dynamic econometric models. Several advantages 
found for techniques that estimate the relationship between variables apparently not 
associated, show that the subject of capital structure could be explored in ways beyond panel 
data techniques. 
However, making aggregate variables from the weighting of firm-level variables, by 
theoretical portfolio linked to the liquidity issues could become a restriction. Such a 
restriction should be addressed with a cointegration panel in future research, which combines 
the advances in panel data with long-run and short-run relationships. 
 
 
Future research could also specify models with variables for institutional characteristics 
and even for industries.  
The direct measures of asymmetric information could be used in the model specification 
in order to assess the stock market development theory. Of course, the NovoMercado would 
represent better information access to investors. Using the asymmetric information measure in 
this context, the association between stock and debt will be even more accurate.  
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GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA E ESTRUTURA DE CAPITAL NO BRASIL: 
AÇÕES, DÍVIDAS E SUBSTITUIÇÃO 
 
RESUMO 
Objetivo: Examinar os mercados de ações e de dívidas no Brasil, através do teste da teoria de 
desenvolvimento do mercado de ações de Demirgüc-Kunt & Maksimovic (1996). 
Originalidade/Lacuna/Relevância/Implicações: Teste da hipótese de substituição do 
mercado de dívidas pelo de ações no Brasil, com melhor governança corporativa e  
cointegração. Os resultados indicam a rejeição da hipótese de substituição, com associação 
positiva entre ações e dívidas em situação em segmento de melhor governança corporativa. É 
aprimorada a teoria de desenvolvimento do mercado de ações em desenvolvimento com 
técnicas de cointegração com variáveis em nível e a prática é a de que o estímulo aos 
mecanismos de governança corporativa pode ampliar simultaneamente os mercados de ações 
e de dívidas.  
Principais aspectos metodológicos – Pesquisa positivista com metodologia quantitativa e 
análise de dados de 171 empresas brasileiras de capital aberto durante 20 anos através de 
cointegração. A hipótese nula foi a de associação negativa entre os mercados de ações e de 
dívidas. 
Síntese dos principais resultados – Rejeição da hipótese nula, de forma inconsistente ao 
referencial teórico. 
Principais considerações/conclusões: Um melhor nível de governança corporativa pode 
fazer com que capital próprio e de terceiros sejam fontes complementares e não substitutas de 
recursos, sugerindo que as reformas de governança corporativa promovidas no país, formam 
um ciclo virtuoso entre ações e dívidas. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE 
Desenvolvimento do Mercado de Ações. Desenvolvimento do Mercado de Dívidas. Estrutura 
de Capital. Governança Corporativa. Hipótese de complementariedade entre dívidas e ações. 
 
 
GOBIERNO CORPORATIVO Y ESTRUCTURA DE CAPITAL EN BRASIL: 
ACCIONES, DEUDAS Y REEMPLAZO  
 
RESUMEN 
 
 
Objetivo: Examinar los mercados de acciones y de deudas en Brasil, a través de la prueba de 
la teoría de desarrollo del mercado de acciones de Demirgüc-Kunt & Maksimovic (1996) 
Originalidad/Laguna/Relevancia/Implicaciones: Prueba de la hipótesis de sustitución del 
mercado de deudas pelo de acciones en Brasil, en mejor gobierno corporativo y cointegração. 
Los resultados indican el rechazo de la hipótesis de sustitución en segmento de mejor 
gobierno corporativo. Mejora de la teoría de desarrollo del mercado de acciones para 
mercados en desarrollo con reforma de gobierno corporativo y cointegração con variables en 
nivel y la práctica es a de que el estímulo a los mecanismos de gobierno corporativo puede 
ampliar simultáneamente los mercados de acciones e de deudas.  
Principales aspectos metodológicos Investigación positivista con metodología cuantitativa y 
análisis de datos de 171 empresas brasileñas de capital abierto durante 20 años a través de 
cointegração. La hipótesis nula fue a de asociación negativa entre los mercados de acciones y 
de deudas.  
Síntesis de los principales resultados: Rechazo de la hipótesis nula, de forma inconsistente 
al referencial teórico. 
Principales consideraciones/conclusiones: Un mejor nivel de gobierno corporativo puede 
hacer con que capital propio y de terceros sean fuentes complementarias y no sustitutas de 
recursos, sugiriendo que las reformas de gobierno corporativo promovidas en el país, forman 
un ciclo virtuoso entre acciones y deudas. 
PALABRAS CLAVE 
Desarrollo del Mercado de Acciones. Desarrollo del Mercado de Deudas. Estructura de 
Capital. Gobierno Corporativo. Hipótesis de complementariedad entre deudas y acciones. 
 
